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CRIMINAL LAW-The Child Abuse Statute Now Requires
Criminal Negligence: Santillanes v. State
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Santillanes v. State,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
mens rea element of negligence in the New Mexico child abuse statute'
requires a showing of criminal negligence instead of ordinary civil negligence.3 That is, to satisfy the statute's element of negligence, the prosecution must prove that "the defendant knew or should have known of
the danger involved and [that the defendant] acted with a reckless disregard
for the safety or health of the child." ' 4 The court in Santillanes specifically
overruled every case that had applied a civil negligence standard to the
child abuse statute' and mandated the prospective application of a criminal
negligence standard. 6 This Note provides a description of the case, a
brief history of the interpretation of the child abuse statute, an analysis
of the court's rationale and an examination of the implications of the
decision.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Vincent Santillanes was convicted of child abuse involving no death
or great bodily injury under section 30-6-1(C). 7 The conviction arose out
of an incident in which Santillanes cut his 7-year-old nephew's neck with
a knife .8 Santillanes claimed that the child injured himself by jumping
into a fishing line strung between two trees. However, the jury found
that Santillanes cut his nephew's throat with a knife during an altercation. 9
On appeal to the court of appeals, Santillanes claimed that the trial
court erred in refusing his requested instruction that stated a criminal
negligence standard. The instruction offered by Santillanes set forth a
criminal negligence standard to define the negligence element of section

1. 115 N.M. 215, 849 P.2d 358 (1993).
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(c) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
3. 115 N.M. at 222, 849 P.2d at 365. Justice Frost wrote the 5-0 opinion for the court.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 225 n.7, 849 P.2d at 368 n.7.
6. Id. at 225, 849 P.2d at 368.
7. The child abuse statute reads as follows:
Abuse of a child consists of a person knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and
without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be:
(1)placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health;
(2) tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished; or
(3) exposed to the inclemency of the weather.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
8. 115 N.M. at 216, 849 P.2d at 359.
9. Id. at 223, 849 P.2d at 366.
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30-6-1(C).1 0 The instruction was based upon the definition of criminal
negligence found in the Model Penal Code." The trial court refused
Santillanes' requested instruction and instructed the jury on a civil negligence standard. 12 On appeal, Santillanes claimed that the offered instruction was in error because the term "negligently" as used in the
statute was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad in violation of due
process of law.'" The court of appeals, however, held that because
Santillanes' requested instruction incorrectly defined criminal negligence
and thus was confusing to the jury, he failed to preserve the issue for
appeal and as a result lacked standing to complain of any violation of
due process.

14

On appeal to the supreme court, Santillanes argued that section 30-61 was unconstitutional because it wrongly criminalized ordinary civil
negligence. He further argued that felony punishment should attach only
to criminal behavior and that according felony status to acts of civil
negligence violates substantive due process. 15 Finally, Santillanes argued
that interpreting the term "negligently" to require only a civil negligence
standard overreaches the statute's aim by incorporating conduct that is

10. Santillanes' requested instruction stated:
An act, to be "negligence" or to be done "negigently," must be one which a
reasonably prudent person would foresee as creating a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of injury to Paul Santillanes. The risk created must be of such a nature and
degree that the reasonably prudent person's failure to perceive it involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would observe
in the same situation.
115 N.M. at 217, 849 P.2d at 360.
11. The Code states:
(d) Negligently
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose
of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02(d) (1985).

12. The civil negligence instruction offered by the trial court states as follows:
The term "negligence" may relate either to an act or a failure to act.
An act, to be "negligence," must be one which a reasonably prudent person
would foresee as involving an unreasonable risk of injury to himself or to another
and which such a person, in the exercise of ordinary care, would not do.
A failure to act, to be "negligence," must be a failure to do an act which one
is under a duty to do and which a reasonably prudent person, in the exercise of
ordinary care, would do in order to prevent injury to himself or to another.
115 N.M. at 217, 849 P.2d at 360.
13. 115 N.M. at 217, 849 P.2d at 360.
14. Id. Despite its ruling, the court of appeals examined the trial court's record for fundamental
error. The court concluded that because the evidence met the requirements of both criminal and
civil negligence, no justiciable issue existed in this case regarding any distinction between civil and
criminal negligence in the statute. Id.
15. Id. at 217, 849 P.2d at 360. While violation of the statute is now a third-degree felony, it
was a fourth-degree felony at the time of Santillanes' conviction. See N.M. STAT. AN. § 30-6l(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
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not criminal, but simply negligent, and thus is overbroad in violation of
6
process.'
due
The supreme court ruled that Santillanes did preserve
his issue for
appeal and that the court of appeals had erred in its interpretation of
the relevant rule as to preservation of error.' 7 The supreme court held
that Santillanes' requested instruction was sufficiently similar to the definition of criminal negligence of the Model Penal Code to preserve the
issue for appeal.'"
The court then held that the term "negligently" in section 30-6-1
requires a criminal negligence standard rather than an ordinary civil
negligence standard.19 As a result, the supreme court held that the trial
court had erred in giving the civil negligence instruction. 20 The court
went on to specifically overrule those cases to the extent that they had
applied a civil negligence standard to the child abuse statute. 2' However,
the court affirmed Santillanes' conviction, holding that no rational jury
could have concluded that Santillanes' actions fell short of the standard
of criminal negligence, and therefore the error in jury instructions was
not reversible. 22
III.

CASE HISTORY: THE PRE-SANTILLANES STANDARD
Prior to the decision in Santillanes, New Mexico courts had consistently
applied a civil negligence standard under the child abuse statute to cases
dating back to 1976. Moreover, New Mexico courts had regularly rejected
constitutional challenges to the statute. 23 The relevant case history can
be divided into two categories: (a) those cases which established section
30-6-1 as a "strict liability" statute; and (b) those cases that did not
directly address section 30-6-1 but are analogous in that they refer to
the impropriety of applying a civil negligence standard to criminal actions.

16. Id. at 217-18, 849 P.2d at 360-61.
17. Id. at 218, 849 P.2d at 361 (citing N.M. R. CraM. P. 5-608(D)).
18. Id. The court noted that under Rule 5-608, counsel must offer a proper instruction to
preserve error only if no instruction is given on the issue. In this case, there was an instruction
given and it is the correctness of the instruction that is the subject of the appeal. The court further
stated that because there is no uniform jury instruction on criminal negligence in New Mexico,
Santillanes' reliance on the Model Penal Code was proper, and the instruction offered by Santillanes
captured the essence of the Model Penal Code's definition of criminal negligence. Id.
19. Id. at 222, 849 P.2d at 365.
20. Id. at 223, 849 P.2d at 366.
21. Id. at 225 n.7 849 P.2d at 368 n.7 (overruling State v. Crislip, 110 N.M. 412, 796 P.2d
1108 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 260, 794 P.2d 734 (1990); State v. Williams, 100 N.M.
322, 670 P.2d 122 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 259, 669 P.2d 735 (1983); State v. Robinson,
93 N.M. 340, 600 P.2d 286 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286 (1979); State v.
Coe, 92 N.M. 320, 587 P.2d 973 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554 (1978); and
State v. Adams, 89 N.M. 737, 557 P.2d 586 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619
(1976)).
22. 115 N.M. 215, 223, 849 P.2d 358, 366.
23. See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 98 N.M. 204, 647 P.2d 406 (1982); Crislip, 110 N.M. 412, 796
P.2d 1108; Williams, 110 N.M. 322, 670 P.2d 122; State v. Fulton, 99 N.M. 348, 657 P.2d 1197,
(Ct. App. 1983); Robinson, 93 N.M. 340, 600 P.2d 286; Coe, 92 N.M. 320, 587 P.2d 973; State
v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212
(1975).
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State v. Grubbs and the Development of Section 30-6-1 Standards
State v. Grubbs laid the foundation for applying a civil negligence
standard to section 30-6-1. In Grubbs, the defendant was convicted of
involuntary manslaughter by negligent use of a weapon. 25 The defendant
appealed his conviction on the grounds that the felony offense required
a standard of negligence which was different or greater than ordinary
negligence. 26 The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
holding that the trial court properly gave an instruction based on ordinary
civil negligence. 27 The court noted that the term "negligent" was not
defined in the statute and there was no evidence that the 8legislature
intended to give the term anything but its ordinary meaning.
Although Grubbs did not involve section 30-6-1, New Mexico courts
have consistently relied upon its holding in applying a civil negligence
standard to section 30-6-1.29 Moreover, the courts resisted challenges to
the statute based upon the inappropriateness of the civil standard. For
example, in State v. Lucero,30 the trial court dismissed an indictment
under the statute on the ground that the statute made no distinction
among intentional, knowing or negligent acts nor did it provide for lesser
offenses according to the degree of culpability of the defendant. 31 As a
result, the statute unconstitutionally denied defendants equal protection
under the laws. 3 2 The court of appeals vacated the order on the grounds
that it was well within the authority of the legislature to make a negligent
act a crime. 33 The court characterized section 30-6-1 as a strict liability
found its basis in the compelling public interest in protecting
statute which
4
children.
In State v. Dorothy Lucero,3 5 the supreme court repeated Lucero's
strict liability interpretation. In Dorothy Lucero, the court reasoned that
section 30-6-1 was a "strict liability statute" and that the state of mind
of the defendant was immaterial.3 6 The court reiterated the state's interest
in protecting abused children and noted that it was well within the rights
of an act criminal without
of the legislature to make the commission
37
wrongdoer.
the
of
intent
the
to
regard

A.

24. 85 N.M. 365, 512 P.2d 693 (1973), cited in Santillanes, 115 N.M. at 219-20, 849 P.2d at
362-63.
25. Id. at 366, 512 P.2d at 694. The conviction was based on what is now N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-7-4(A)(3) (1993 Cum. Supp.). See Grubbs, 85 N.M. at 366, 512 P.2d at 694.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 368, 512 P.2d at 696.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 93 N.M. 340, 345, 600 P.2d 286, 291 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286 (1976).
30. 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (1975), cited in Santillanes, 115 N.M. 215, 218, 849 P.2d 358,

361.
31. Id. at 243-44, 531 P.2d at 1216-17.

32. Id.
33. Id.

at 245, 531 P.2d at 1218.

34. Id. at 244, 531 P.2d at 1217.
35. 98 N.M. 204, 647 P.2d 406 (1982),

358, 362 n.3.
36. Id. at 206, 647 P.2d at 408.
37. Id.

cited in Santillanes, 115 N.M. 215, 219 n.3, 849 P.2d
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State v. Coe,38 a court of appeals decision, stands in contrast to the
cases discussed above. In Coe, the court rejected the defendant's argument
that the child abuse statute was unconstitutionally vague because the
court found that the civil negligence standard covers any and all harm
that might befall a child.3 9 The court stated that the statute did not apply
to ordinary situations where a child was injured, but only to those where
the parent performs some abusive act.4 Coe seemed to indicate that
something more than ordinary negligence is required by "section 30-6-1.
However, the Coe court did not expressly overrule Lucero or Dorothy
Lucero, and it did not hold that the statute required a criminal negligence
standard.
B. Raton v. Rice and the Criminal Negligence Standard
Case law regarding reckless driving seems to contradict the decisions
interpreting section 30-6-1 in that the cases do not allow civil negligence
to be the basis for a criminal conviction. In Raton v. Rice,4 1 the supreme
court held that in the area of reckless driving, mere negligence was
insufficient to form the basis of a criminal charge. 42 The court noted
that while ordinary negligence may be enough to compel a driver to pay
damages, it is not sufficient under the possibility of a penitentiary sentence.43
Raton demonstrated that, at least in the area of reckless driving, the
supreme court was unwilling to apply a civil negligence standard if
incarceration might have resulted.
Because reckless driving, like child abuse, involves a compelling public
safety interest, the result of Raton seems inconsistent with the rationale
of the pre-Santillaneschild abuse cases. Unlike those cases, Raton indicates
that even when a safety interest is at issue, the court is reluctant to
apply a civil negligence standard to cases in which incarceration may
result.
IV.

RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF SANTILLANES

The Court's Rationale
The decision in Santillanes explicitly abandons the civil negligence
standard previously employed by the courts in favor of a criminal standard." The court ruled that the legislature's failure to define the term
"negligently," coupled with its attachment of felony punishment to the
statute, created a reasonable doubt as to the intended scope of proscribed
A.

38. 92 N.M. 320, 587 P.2d 973 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554 (1978),
cited in Santillanes, 115 N.M. 215, 219, 849 P.2d 358, 362.
39. Id. at 321, 587 P.2d at 974.
40. Id.
41. 52 N.M. 363, 199 P.2d 986 (1948).
42. Id.at 365, 199 P.2d at 987.
43. Id.
44. 115 N.M. at 222, 849 P.2d at 365.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

conduct.4 5 As a result, applying a civil negligence standard to the statute
improperly goes beyond the statute's intended scope by criminalizing
conduct that is not morally contemptible.46
By focusing on the statute's intended scope, the court framed the issue
in Santillanes as one of statutory construction: "the question is when
the legislature has included but not defined the mens rea element in a
criminal statute, here the term "negligently," what degree of negligence
is required. 4
In answering this question, the court looked at the type of criminal
conduct the statute was intended to address. The court stated that criminal
statutes generally fall into one of two categories: "regulatory measures"
and "serious nonregulatory crimes.'"'4 The court notes that:
[g]enerally, a regulatory measure arising from the exercise of the
legislature's police power is aimed at the achievement of some societal
good rather than at the punishment of a crime that is malum in se,
or in other words, exhibiting an "evil mind" ..... Serious nonregulatory crimes, on the other hand, generally proscribe conduct manifesting moral culpability.4 9
To determine the category into which the legislature intended to place
the child abuse statute, the court focused on the felony punishment
attached to violation of the statute. The court noted that penalties for
regulatory crimes have traditionally been slight, while penalties for crimes
requiring mens rea generally have been higher.5 0 As the court stated,
"when moral condemnation and social opprobrium attach to the conviction of a crime, the crime should typically reflect a mental state
warranting such contempt."'"
The court stated that the attachment of felony punishment to the
statute, combined with the legislature's failure to define the term "neg-5 2
ligently," created a reasonable doubt as to the statute's intended scope.
The court further noted that a statute defining criminal conduct must

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 218-19, 849 P.2d at 361-62. Note that the court specifically refused to find the statute
unconstitutional either on the basis of vagueness or on the basis of overbreadth. First, the court

stated that the statute was clearly not so vague as to violate due process, as "[p]ersons of common
intelligence certainly could apply either the civil negligence standard or the criminal negligence
standard without having to guess as to what conduct was proscribed under each standard." Id. at
221, 849 P.2d at 364. Second, the court stated that the statute was overbroad in that the term
"negligently" encompasses conduct that the statute cannot be interpreted to proscribe. However,
the constitutional doctrine of overbreadth "serves to invalidate a statute only when it sweeps so
broadly to impinge unnecessarily on conduct protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
... [nJo such constitutionally protected conduct is involved here." Id. (citing State v. Silva, 86
N.M. 543, 547, 525 P.2d 903, 907 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888 (1974)).
48. 115 N.M. 215, 221-22, 849 P.2d 358, 364-65.
49. Id. (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 222, 849 P.2d at 365.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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be strictly construed," and that any doubts about the construction of
penal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity. 54 As a result, applying
a civil negligence standard to the statute improperly goes beyond the
statute's intended scope." The court interpreted the legislature's attachment of felony punishment to the statute without clearly indicating that
ordinary civil negligence is a "sufficient predicate for a felony ' 5 6 to mean
that the intended scope of the statute was to punish conduct that is
morally culpable, not merely inadvertent. 7 Thus, the mens rea element
of negligence in the statute requires a showing of criminal negligence
rather than ordinary civil negligence. 5"
B.

Implications for the Future
The effect of the Santillanes ruling was to bring interpretation of the
term "negligently" in the child abuse statute in line with the court's
decisions regarding negligence in the area of reckless driving. In other
words, courts should not apply a civil negligence standard to a criminal
matter without a clear indication from the legislature that a civil negligence
standard is intended.5 9 In making this decision, the court placed great
weight on the felony punishment attached to the crime: "[W]e find this
concept firmly rooted in our jurisprudence: When a crime is punishable
as a felony, civil negligence ordinarily is an inappropriate predicate by
which to define such criminal conduct."0 In requiring a showing of
criminal negligence, the court invoked the reasoning of a 1948 case rather
than two decades of decisions specifically interpreting section 30-6-1 to
require only a civil negligence standard. 61
The decision in Santillanes makes it more difficult for prosecutors to
obtain convictions under section 30-6-1. To meet the Santillanes interpretation of the term "negligently" in the statute, the prosecution must
prove that the defendant "knew or should have known of the danger
involved and acted with a reckless disregard for the safety or health of
the child." 62 That the court was willing to make convictions more difficult

53. Id. at 221, 849 P.2d at 364 (citing Bokum Resources Corp. v. New Mexico Water Quality
Control Comm'n, 93 N.M. 546, 549,603 P.2d 285, 288 (1979)).
54. Id. at 221, 849 P.2d at 364 (citing State v. Leiding, 112 N.M. 143, 145, 812 P.2d 797, 799
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575 (1991)).
55. Santillanes, 115 N.M. at 222, 849 P.2d at 365.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The court held that its decision would be applied prospectively, rather than retroactively.
Id. at 224, 849 P.2d at 367 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)). The court stated
that prospective application was proper because law enforcement officials have relied on the civil
negligence standard for at least 15 years. In addition, because the morally culpable behavior that
the criminal negligence standard is intended to deter was proscribed under the previous standard,
applying the rule retroactively would not further its purpose. Finally, the court noted that retroactive
effect would unduly burden the judicial system and "reopen old wounds and create new scars for
child abuse victims and their families." Id.
59. Id. at 222, 849 P.2d at 365.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Raton v. Rice, 52 N.M. 363, 199 P.2d 986 (1948)).
62. Id.
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to obtain despite the sensitive nature of the subject matter indicates the
court's determination to construe criminal statutes narrowly, even when
an issue of public safety is at stake. The court acknowledged the state's
argument that the statute "reflects a compelling public interest in protecting defenseless children,' '63 but nevertheless limited the application of
the statute in order to insure that it was not employed beyond the scope
intended by the legislature. 64
In addition, by classifying section 30-6-1 as a statute addressing a
"serious nonregulatory crime," the court's decision contradicts years of
earlier cases which characterize section 30-6-1 as a "strict liability" statute.
By construing the intended scope of the statute to punish conduct that
is "morally culpable, not merely inadvertent,'"' the court implied that
the term "strict liability" as traditionally used no longer applies to the
child abuse standard. In light of the court's requirement that proof that
the defendant "knew or should have known of the danger involved and
67
acted with a reckless disregard for the safety or health of the child"
was a necessary element of negligence, any characterization of section
30-6-1 as a strict liability statute would be inaccurate.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Santillanes, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the term
"negligently" in the child abuse statute requires application of a criminal
negligence standard rather than a civil negligence standard. In order to
meet the element of negligence, the state must prove that the defendant
"knew or should have known of the danger involved and acted with a
reckless disregard for the safety of the child." '6 The court specifically
overruled those cases which had applied a civil negligence standard to
the child abuse statute. In doing so, the court made it more difficult to
obtain child abuse convictions under section 30-6-1, and demonstrated
its willingness to construe criminal statutes narrowly even when a matter
of compelling public interest was at issue.
GREGORY P. WILLIAMS

63. Id. at 219, 849 P.2d at 362.
64. The court took pains to note that it was not "defining the crime of negligent child abuse,
thus usurping the police power of the legislature," but merely "interpreting the statute in light of
traditional concerns regarding the intended scope of criminal statutes." Id. at 224, 849 P.2d at 367.
Moreover, the court stated that it was within the rights of the legislature in the future to indicate
that 'the public interest in the matter is so compelling or that the potential for harm is so great
that the interests of the public must override the interests of the individual' so as to justify civil
negligence as a predicate for a felony." Id. at 223, 849 P.2d at 366 (citing State v. Barber, 91
N.M. 764, 581 P.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1978)).
65. See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M.
239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975); State v. Lucero, 98 N.M. 204, 647 P.2d 406 (1982).
66. 115 N.M. at 222, 849 P.2d at 365.
67. Id.
68. Id.

